What Professor Quigley foretold about the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has also come to pass. The BIS now has 55 member nations and heads the global financial pyramid.
The power of the BIS was seen in 1988, when it raised the capital requirement of its member banks from 6% to 8% in an accord called Basel I. The result was to cripple the Japanese banks, which until then were the world’s largest creditors. Japan entered a recession from which it has not yet recovered.
U.S. banks managed to escape by dodging the capital requirement. They did this by moving loans off their books, bundling them up as “securities,” and selling them to investors.
To persuade the investors to buy them, these mortgage-backed securities were protected against default with “derivatives,” which were basically just bets. The “protection seller” collected a premium for agreeing to pay in the event of default. The “protection buyer” bought the premium. Owning the asset was not required. Like gamblers at a horse race, derivative players could bet without owning a horse.
Derivatives became a very popular form of gambling. The result was the mother of all bubbles, exceeding $500 trillion by the end of 2007.
Because of securitization and derivatives, credit mushroomed. Virtually anyone who walked in the door could get a loan.
The tipping point came in August 2007, with the collapse of two hedge funds. When the derivatives scheme was exposed, the market for derivative-protected securities suddenly dried up. But the U.S. stock market did not collapse until November 2007, when new accounting rules were imposed. The rules grew out of the Basel II Accords initiated by the BIS in 2004. “Mark to market” accounting required banks to value their assets according to market demand that day. Many U.S. banks, like those in Japan in the 1990s, suddenly had insufficient capital to make new loans. The result was a credit crisis from which the U.S. has not yet recovered.
The BIS has now become global regulator, just as Quigley foresaw. In April 2009, the G20 nations agreed to be regulated by a Financial Stability Board based in the BIS, and to comply with “standards and codes” set by the Board. The codes are only guidelines, but countries that fail to comply risk downgrades in their credit ratings, something so costly that the guidelines have effectively become laws.
An article on the BIS website states that central banks in the Central Bank Governance Network should have as their single or primary objective “to preserve price stability.” That means governments should not devalue the national currency by inflating the money supply; and that means not “printing money” or borrowing credit created by their own central banks. Like the American colonies after King George took away their power to issue their own money, governments must fund their deficits by borrowing from private banks. The bankers’ global control over currency issuance has become virtually complete.
The effects of this policy are particularly evident in the European Union, where EU rules allow deficits of only 3% of government budgets and prevent member countries from either issuing their own money or borrowing credit advanced by their own central banks. Member nations must borrow instead from the European Central Bank, private international banks, or the IMF. The result has been forced austerity measures, as seen in Greece and Ireland. The system is so unsustainable that commentators are predicting that the EU may break up.